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ABSTRACT
The effective tax rate on equity securities has fluctuated considerably in the U.S. between 1917-
2004. This study investigates whether personal taxes on equity securities are related to stock
valuations using the time-series variation in tax burdens. The paper finds an economically and
statistically significant relationship between asset valuations and personal tax rates. Consistent with
tax capitalization, stock valuations tend to be relatively low when tax burdens are relatively high.
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Taxes have an important impact on e®ective asset returns for taxable investors. If the
marginal investor is subject to taxes, then asset valuations and asset returns should
re°ect this tax burden in equilibrium. In particular, to compensate taxable investors
for their tax burden, before-tax asset returns should be higher and asset valuations
should be lower in periods of relatively high tax rates. On the other hand, taxes
should not a®ect asset valuations if the marginal investor is e®ectively tax-exempt,
as ¯rst discussed by Miller and Scholes (1978). This study tests empirically whether
dividend and capital gains taxes are capitalized into asset prices using a new data
set covering personal tax burdens on the aggregate U.S. stock market over the period
between 1917-2004.
The e®ect of personal dividend and capital gains taxes on stock prices and stock
returns has received a lot of attention in the economics, accounting, and ¯nance
literatures.1 A ¯rst group of papers has analyzed whether asset returns depend on
dividend yields, based on the after-tax version of the CAPM by Brennan (1970).2 A
second group of papers attempts to identify the relationship between tax rates and
dividend yields using ex-dividend date price data.3 A third group of papers analyzes
whether there is a relationship between asset valuations and tax rates.4
Despite the extensive literature in this area, the question of whether taxes are
capitalized or not has not yet been resolved. Whereas the previous empirical literature
on tax capitalization analyzed primarily the cross-section of asset prices and asset
1See Auerbach (2002), Poterba (2002), and Allen and Michaely (2003) for reviews of this litera-
ture.
2The papers in this literature include, for example, Black and Scholes (1974), Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy (1979), Blume (1980), Gordon and Bradford (1980), Miller and Scholes (1982), Poterba
and Summers (1984), and Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (1998).
3The papers in this literature include, for example, Elton and Gruber (1970), Eades, Hess, and
Kim (1984), Barclay (1987), Michaely (1991), Frank and Jagannathan (1998), Green and Rydqvist
(1999), Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005), and Chetty,
Rosenberg, and Saez (2005)
4See, for example, Fama and French (1998), Harris, Hubbard, and Kemsley (2001), and Auerbach
and Hassett (2005).
1returns, my paper sheds light on this tax capitalization controversy by performing a
new test based on the substantial time-series variation in e®ective tax rates on equity
securities.
My paper is related to McGrattan and Prescott (2005), who derive the quantitative
impact of tax and regulatory changes on equity values using a growth theory model.
They show that these regulatory changes can explain the large secular movements in
corporate equity values relative to GDP. McGrattan and Prescott (2005) base their
inferences on a carefully calibrated growth model. However, they do not perform an
econometric analysis of the relationship between tax rates and asset valuations. The
test in my paper investigates empirically whether there is a statistically signi¯cant
relationship between taxes and asset valuations over the longer period between 1917-
2004. Consistent with McGrattan and Prescott (2005), I ¯nd a negative relationship
between asset valuations and asset prices controlling for many macroeconomic factors.
An in°uential literature in public economics has investigated the impact of divi-
dend tax changes on economic activity. Under the \traditional" view dividend taxes
a®ect the marginal source of ¯nance, while under the \new" view developed by King
(1977), Auerbach (1979), and Bradford (1981) dividend taxes have no impact on the
investment incentives of ¯rms using retentions as marginal source of funds. There
has been a signi¯cant debate concerning the relative importance of these two views:
For example, Poterba and Summers (1985) support the traditional view, while Desai
and Goolsbee (2004) and Auerbach and Hassett (2005) ¯nd more support for the new
view. Although my paper does not directly test the implications of the two views,
the theoretical model and the empirical results are broadly consistent with the \new
view."
The ¯rst part of the paper derives asset valuations in a stylized general equilibrium
model, based on the exchange economy model of Lucas (1978). My model generalizes
the Lucas model by introducing stochastic dividend taxes. The theoretical results
2show that, under plausible conditions, asset valuations tend to be lower in periods
where taxes are relatively high. Relatively low asset valuations in high-tax regimes
generate relatively high before-tax returns, which compensate investors for the tax
burden. The theoretical model in my paper di®ers from McGrattan and Prescott
(2005) by explicitly incorporating the uncertainty of the tax code.
The second part of the paper computes e®ective tax rates on equity securities
following Poterba (1987b) and McGrattan and Prescott (2005). This section demon-
strates that the aggregate tax burden of equity securities has varied signi¯cantly
between 1917-2004. For example, the e®ective tax rate on equity securities amounted
to approximately 40 percent in the early 1950s and declined to about 5 percent in
2004. These substantial variations in tax rates are caused by three main factors:
First, several recent tax reforms gradually reduced the marginal statutory tax rates
on investment income. Second, corporations adjusted their distribution behavior and
substituted tax-favored share repurchases for highly taxed dividends during the last
decades. Third, the introduction of pensions and other tax-quali¯ed savings oppor-
tunities reduced the proportion of equities held by taxable investors signi¯cantly,
resulting in a decrease in the e®ective tax rate.
The main part of the paper presents a new test of tax capitalization that relates
equity valuations, such as the price-earnings ratio of the aggregate stock market, to
e®ective tax rates between 1917-2004. I ¯nd a negative relationship between asset
valuations and e®ective tax rates controlling for various macroeconomic factors. The
negative relationship is both statistically and economically signi¯cant. Consistent
with tax capitalization, I also ¯nd a positive relationship between taxes and asset re-
turns, indicating that investors are compensated for higher taxes with higher average
before-tax returns.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 investigates the relationship between
dividend taxes and asset valuations in a stylized general equilibrium model. Section 3
3summarizes the major tax reforms between 1913 and 2004 and derives the historical
e®ective tax rates on asset returns over this period. Section 4 reports the main
results of this paper, investigating whether there is a systematic relationship between
the e®ective tax rate and equity valuations using the time-series variation in the
e®ective tax rate of the U.S. stock market. This section also includes a large number
of robustness tests that con¯rm the results using various speci¯cations. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theory
This section describes a stylized general equilibrium model of asset markets that
generalizes the Lucas (1978) model by introducing stochastic dividend taxation.5
2.1 Assumptions
The output in the exchange economy is exogenous and perishable. Aggregate output
d > 0 follows a geometric random walk with drift, where zt+1 denotes its stochastic
growth rate. Output growth zt+1 has a constant mean of ¹ and a standard deviation
of ¾. The distribution of the variables is assumed to remain constant over time.
dt+1 = dt exp(zt+1); zt+1 » N(¹;¾
2): (1)
The economy consists of only one security that corresponds to the market portfolio
of all assets. It is possible to introduce additional assets that are in zero net supply
without a®ecting the main asset pricing implications. The asset pays the dividend of
dt at the beginning of each period t. The price of equity pt is de¯ned `ex-dividend.'
5The model presented in this section is related to the model in Sialm (2005a), who analyzes the
impact of stochastic taxation on equity and term premia. One di®erence between the two models
is that the model in the current paper describes a dividend tax while the model in Sialm (2005a)
describes a consumption tax.
4Assets can be traded without incurring any transaction costs, and investors face no
borrowing or short-selling constraints.
The government taxes the dividends at a °at tax rate ¿t. Tax rates are stochastic
and follow a two-state Markov-Chain with 0 · ¿L < ¿H < 1. The transition proba-
bilities are assumed to be equal in the two states and Á denotes the probability that
the tax rate will not change in the next period:
Á = Prob(¿t+1 = ¿t): (2)
To keep the model tractable, it is necessary to make several simplifying assump-
tions. First, the model assumes a °at tax on the total distributions of companies and
excludes taxes on capital gains. Furthermore, companies are not allowed to adjust
their distribution policies by changing their dividend payout ratios. However, the tax
rate can be thought of as an e®ective tax rate that aggregates all the various tax rates
and also incorporates the corporate distribution behavior in reduced form.6 Second,
the model focuses on the impact of personal taxation and does not explicitly take
into account corporate taxes, since the dividends paid by the companies are already
adjusted for corporate taxes. Thus, a change in the corporation tax would a®ect the
dividend process instead. Third, the growth rate of the economy is assumed to be
independent of the tax regime. Numerical computations show that this assumption
has no signi¯cant impact on the qualitative results for plausible calibrations.
The representative consumer purchases the asset in quantity xt to maximize ex-
pected life-time utility. The discount factor is denoted by ¯ 2 (0;1). The period
utility is denoted by u(c), where u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) · 0.
6For example, if companies reduce their dividend distributions in high-tax regimes and replace
the dividends partially with tax-preferred share repurchases, then the e®ective tax rate would not
increase as much as the statutory dividend tax rate. Companies will not completely o®set tax
changes if there are some bene¯ts of paying dividends.







ct = (1 ¡ ¿t)dtxt¡1 + pt(xt¡1 ¡ xt): (4)
Consumers are assumed to have a power-utility function with a coe±cient of







Individuals with ® = 0 are risk-neutral and individuals with ® = 1 have logarith-
mic preferences u(ct) = ln(ct). With power utility, the risk aversion coe±cient equals
the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.





(pt+1 + (1 ¡ ¿t)dt+1)
¸
: (6)
This equation shows that the price of the asset pt is the present discounted value
of the future expected after-tax value of the asset pt+1 + (1 ¡ ¿t+1)dt+1, where the
stochastic discount factor is mt+1 = ¯u0(ct+1)=u0(ct).






0(ct+i)(1 ¡ ¿t+i)pt+1xt+i] = 0: (7)
For market equilibrium, the demand of the asset must equal the exogenous supply.
6In equilibrium, the consumption of the representative agent amounts to:
ct = (1 ¡ ¿t)dt: (8)
2.2 Equity Valuations



















(±t+1 + (1 ¡ ¿t+1))
#
: (9)
This valuation equation is time-homogenous and depends only on the current tax
regime and is denoted by ±t = ±H if ¿t = ¿H and ±t = ±L otherwise. The price-dividend
ratios of the asset can be solved in closed form, as shown in Appendix A.
This section determines the conditions under which equity valuations are higher
in the low-tax regimes.
Proposition 1 The price-dividend ratio is higher (lower) in the low-tax regime if the
tax regimes are relatively persistent (transient):
±L R ±H if Á R ~ Á:
Proof: All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 indicates that asset valuations are relatively higher in the low-tax
regime whenever tax regimes are su±ciently persistent. However, this condition is
not very restrictive. As shown in the Appendix, the condition Á > ~ Á is always is
satis¯ed if Á > 0:5 and tax rates are more likely to remain unchanged than to change.
7Furthermore, this condition also is satis¯ed if investors are su±ciently risk-averse
(® > 0:5) for any persistence levels Á.
To illustrate the impact of taxes on asset valuations, I compute numerically price-
dividend ratios in the two tax regimes for four di®erent levels of risk-aversion ® and
at di®erent transition probabilities Á. The numerical example uses the following
parameter values: The time preference factor is ¯ = 0:95; the tax rates in the two
regimes are ¿L = 0:3 and ¿H = 0:4, respectively; the mean dividend growth rate is
¹ = 0:02; and the standard deviation of the dividend growth rate is ¾ = 0:1. The
results do not depend signi¯cantly on these assumed parameter values.
Figure 1 depicts the price-dividend ratios at di®erent persistence levels. The ¯rst
plot depicts the price-dividend ratio if investors are risk-neutral (® = 0). In this
case, asset valuations are higher in the high-tax regime if Á < 0:5. This surprising
result occurs because of the strong mean reversion in tax rates with Á < 0:5, since
tax rates are in this case more likely to be low next period if they are currently high.
If Á = 0:5, then the price-dividend ratio is identical in the two tax regimes, because
taxes are equally likely to be high or low next period regardless of the current tax
level. Overall, valuation levels in the low-tax regime increase with the persistence
level Á, because higher persistence levels indicate that it is more likely that tax rates
also will be low in the next period. This ¯rst e®ect is called the \cash-°ow e®ect,"
because taxes reduce the cash °ows investors obtain from their investments.
If investors are risk-averse, then asset prices will in addition re°ect the desire of
investors to smooth their consumption over time. If taxes are temporarily low, then
their current consumption is relatively high and they would like to save some of the
dividends. In equilibrium, to induce investors to consume the complete after-tax
dividend, the expected returns in low-tax regimes need to be lowered to decrease the
attractiveness of saving. Thus, asset valuations in the low-tax regime will increase rel-
ative to asset valuations in the high-tax regime as risk-aversion increases. The desire
8to smooth consumption becomes less pronounced if tax regimes are more persistent.
This second e®ect is called the \consumption-smoothing e®ect" and goes in the oppo-
site direction from the \cash-°ow e®ect." For example, if risk-aversion is ® = 1, then
the two e®ects exactly o®set each other and the asset valuations in the two regimes
do not depend on the persistence level, as shown in the second plot of Figure 1.
If investors are more risk-averse than log-utility investors, then the \consumption-
smoothing e®ect" dominates and the price-earnings ratio in the low-tax regime will
decrease with the persistence level.
The price-dividend ratio is higher in the low-tax regime as long as the persistence
level is larger than 50 percent or as long as the risk-aversion is su±ciently large.
The next proposition derives asset valuations in the special case, where taxes are
permanent (Á = 1) and do not change over time.
Proposition 2 If tax regimes are permanent (Á = 1), then the price-dividend equals:




In this case, the price-dividend ratio is proportional to 1¡¿ and remains constant
over time.
The following proposition investigates whether taxes are fully or just partially
capitalized into asset prices:
Proposition 3 If tax regimes are not permanent (Á < 1), then taxes have a more







if ® Q 1:
With log-utility (® = 1), the ratio between the two prices is just ±L=±H = (1 ¡
9¿L)=(1¡¿H). In this case, taxes are fully capitalized into asset valuations. The ratio
between the two asset valuation levels equals in this case the ratio in an environment
with permanent tax rates, as discussed in Proposition 2. This result is surprising
since the only relevant tax rate with log-utility is the tax rate in the current tax
regime. The tax rate in the other tax regime is irrelevant even if there is a positive
probability that this tax rate will eventually a®ect asset valuations. Proposition 3 also
demonstrates that taxes have a more than proportional impact on asset valuations if
investors are more risk-averse than log-utility investors.
2.3 Equity Returns
Finally, I study the relationship between expected returns and tax rates. The before-














Proposition 4 The expected return is higher (lower) in the high-tax regime if the
price-dividend ratio in the high-tax regime is lower (higher) than the price-dividend
ratio in the low-tax regime:
¸H R ¸L if ±H Q ±L:
Propositions 1 and 4 indicate that asset returns are higher and asset valuations
are lower in the high-tax regime as long as tax regimes are su±ciently persistent.
Figure 2 summarizes the corresponding expected returns in the two tax regimes
using the parameter values given in Section 2.2. The expected returns in the high-tax
regime are always higher than the expected returns in the low-tax regime except when
±H ¸ ±L, which occurs at relatively low persistence levels Á · ~ Á.
10The stylized theoretical model in this section demonstrates that under plausible
conditions asset valuations tend to be higher and expected returns tend to be lower
during low tax regimes. In Section 4, I will test these two predictions empirically
using data on U.S. stock prices. The next section derives the time-series of e®ective
tax rates between 1917-2004.
3 E®ective Tax Rates
One of the biggest challenges of analyzing the e®ects of taxes on asset prices is the
identity of the marginal taxpayer. Taxes are irrelevant in asset pricing if the marginal
taxpayer is tax-exempt. On the other hand, taxes will have an impact on asset prices if
the marginal stockholder is an individual in a high tax bracket. This section describes
the derivation of the e®ective tax rates of equity securities over the period between
1917 and 2004. This study follows Poterba (1987b), Poterba (1998), and McGrattan
and Prescott (2005) and constructs dollar-weighted average tax rates for the aggregate
stock market.
3.1 De¯nition of E®ective Tax Rate
The e®ective tax rate of equity securities depends not only on the statutory tax rates,
but also on the distribution properties of equity securities. The tax burden on equity
is reduced if the aggregate dividend yield is smaller, if capital gains are deferred and
capital losses are accelerated, and if a larger proportion of the assets are held in tax-
quali¯ed environments (for example, pensions and tax-deferred retirement accounts).
The e®ective tax rate on equity securities at time t ¿
eff
















The e®ective tax rate depends ¯rst on the marginal tax rates on dividends ¿div
11and short- and long-term capital gains ¿scg and ¿lcg. Whereas realized short-term
capital gains are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate, realized long-term capital
gains are taxed at the capital gains tax rate, which has generally been lower. I use
the average marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains as the relevant tax rates
to compute the e®ective tax rates.
Second, the composition of the sources of income from equity investments has
an important impact on the tax burden of an asset portfolio. The proportion of
the returns paid as dividends is denoted by wdiv, while the proportions of realized
short- and long-term capital gains are denoted by wscg and wlcg.7 The deferral of the
realization of capital gains is bene¯cial because the present value of the tax liabilities
decreases if the tax payments are postponed. In addition, the taxation of capital
gains can be avoided completely due to the \step-up of the cost basis" at the time of
death, which eliminates the taxation of all unrealized capital gains. Optimal deferral
and avoidance strategies can reduce the e®ective tax rates signi¯cantly.8
Third, the ability to invest through pension accounts and other tax-quali¯ed sav-
ings vehicles reduces the e®ective tax rate of stocks. The tax rates on dividends and
capital gains decrease if a larger fraction of the assets are held by tax-exempt investors
or in tax-quali¯ed locations. A more detailed description of the construction of the
e®ective tax rates is given in the Appendix.
3.2 Statutory Tax Rates
Marginal statutory tax rates on ordinary income at the federal level have °uctuated
considerably, as depicted in Figure 3. The ¯gure shows the statutory federal marginal
income tax rates for households in ¯ve di®erent tax brackets. The four lower tax
7Note that the proportions of dividends and realized capital gains do not necessarily add to 100
percent, because capital gains can be deferred inde¯nitely.
8Constantinides (1983), Stiglitz (1983), Constantinides (1984), and Dammon and Spatt (1996)
describe several investment strategies to minimize the taxes of ¯nancial returns. Poterba (1987a),
Auerbach, Burman, and Siegel (2000), and Ivkovich, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005) show that a
large part of the investing public does not engage in tax-minimizing portfolio transactions.
12brackets correspond to real income levels of 50, 100, 250, and 500 thousand U.S.
dollars expressed in 2004 consumer prices. The ¯fth curve corresponds to the top
marginal income tax rate.9 The ¯gure shows the impact of numerous tax reforms
since federal taxes were introduced in 1913. The highest marginal income tax rate
amounted to 94 percent in 1944 and 1945. Since then marginal income tax rates have
declined signi¯cantly.
3.3 Average Marginal Tax Rate
From Figure 3 it is di±cult to determine the actual taxes investors paid, since the
tax bracket of the average investor might change over time. The Internal Revenue
Service publishes since 1917 the distribution of income sources of di®erent taxpayers
in the Statistics of Income. For example, the IRS summarizes annually the total
dividends declared by individuals in di®erent income brackets. The marginal tax
rate can be determined for each of these income brackets. This information allows
the computation of the dollar-weighted marginal tax rate faced by taxable investors
on dividend income, as suggested by Poterba (1987b). This tax rate is called the
\average marginal tax rate." Such tax rates also will be computed for short- and
long-term capital gains. Prior to 1965, I hand-collected tax distribution data from
di®erent issues of the Statistics of Income of the IRS to estimate average marginal
tax rates. Since 1960, the NBER computes the average marginal tax rates.10
State and local governments impose additional taxes on income from ¯nancial
assets. The NBER tax series includes state and local taxes. Prior to 1965, I assume
that the marginal tax rate from states and localities is a ¯xed proportion of the federal
tax rate according to the current revenues of states and local governments relative
9The ¯gure lists the tax rates of households with relatively high income levels since a large portion
of ¯nancial assets is held by individuals in relatively high income tax brackets. Poterba (2000) shows
that the top one percent of equity holders account for 53.2 percent of household holdings of corporate
stock according to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.
10The data can be obtained from http://www.nber.org/»taxsim/dtdy/. Additional information
on their model can be found in Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
13to the federal government. The Appendix explains the construction of the di®erent
time series in more detail.
Figure 4 depicts the average marginal tax rates of dividend income and long-term
capital gains between 1917 and 2004. Average dividend tax rates increased from
approximately 10 percent in 1925 to more than 50 percent in 1943. The dividend
tax rates remained relatively high until Reagan's tax cuts in the 1980s. The Jobs
and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 capped the maximum federal tax on
dividends and long-term capital gains at 15 percent and reduced the average marginal
tax rate on dividends substantially. In 2004, the estimated average marginal tax rate
on dividends equals 18.7 percent. This exceeds the maximum federal tax rate on
quali¯ed dividends primarily because of the additional state and local government
taxes on dividends.
The average marginal tax rate on realized long-term capital gains is generally
less than the average marginal dividend tax. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 brie°y
eliminated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income. In 1997, the
maximum capital gains tax rate was lowered from 28 to 20 percent, which resulted
in a relatively signi¯cant drop in the average capital gains tax rate. The Jobs and
Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 further reduced the federal marginal tax rate
on realized long-term capital gains to 15 percent.
3.4 Sources of Investment Income
The sources of investment income for equity securities varied considerably over our
sample period, as shown in Figure 5. The ¯gure depicts the dividend and the capital
gains yields of U.S. stocks. The dividend yield is de¯ned as the ratio between the
total amount of dividends paid by companies in the Standard & Poor's Composite
Index in a given year divided by the market capitalization of these companies at
the beginning of the corresponding years. The capital gains yield is de¯ned as the
14total amount of realized short- and long-term capital gains on publicly traded equity
securities in each year divided by the initial market capitalization. The data sources
are described in more detail in Appendix B.
Dividend income was an important income source for stockholders during most
of the period, and dividends became relatively less important during the last two
decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, dividend yields decreased substantially as compa-
nies retained a larger proportion of their earnings and as they recognized that share
repurchases have tax advantages for taxable shareholders compared to dividend pay-
ments. This recent drop in the dividend yield decreased the total tax burden of stock
investors, since dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains.
As dividend yields decreased, capital gains have become a more important source
of income of investors. It is interesting to observe that the annual variation in capital
gains realization depends on anticipated tax changes. For example, tax realizations
were very substantial in 1986, the year prior to signi¯cant increases in the long-term
capital gains tax rate enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Shareholders
were aware of the tax reforms and accelerated the realization of capital gains under
the old tax regime.
The IRS also distinguishes between short- and long-term capital gains realizations.
During most years since 1950, realized short-term capital losses exceeded the realized
short-term gains as investors avoided realizing short-term capital gains, which are
taxed heavily relative to long-term capital gains. Furthermore, the absolute short-
term capital gains tend to be considerably smaller in absolute terms than the absolute
long-term capital gains over the sample period.
To eliminate the impact of large changes in capital gains realization, it is assumed
that investors have a ¯xed propensity to realize capital gains and capital losses over
the sample period out of the total capital gains. On the other hand, I use the actual
dividend yield at the beginning of each year as an estimate of the proportion of divi-
15dends paid during a particular time period. Appendix B.3 describes the computation
of the distribution weights in more detail.
3.5 Tax-Quali¯ed Savings Accounts
One of the most in°uential tax reforms has been the introduction of various types of
tax-quali¯ed pension and retirement accounts, resulting in a substantial decline in the
proportion of stocks held by taxable investors. The proportion of corporate equity
held by taxable investors decreased from more than 90 percent in the 1950s to 55
percent in 2004.11 This dramatic decline is primarily due to the increased importance
of pension funds, tax-deferred retirement accounts, and nonpro¯t organizations. The
proportion of equity held in taxable accounts is estimated using the Flow of Funds
published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank.12
3.6 E®ective Tax Rates
The empirical section of this paper relates the e®ective tax rate to the valuation levels
of equity securities. The e®ective tax rate in equation (11) depends on the dividend
yield of equity securities, which is inversely related to the valuation level of equity
securities. To avoid any spurious correlation between the valuation measures and the














This alternative de¯nition of e®ective tax rates eliminates the impact of the large
variation of dividend and capital gains yields by using the averages of the distribution
weights of dividends (wdiv =
P
t wdiv




t =T) and long-term
11Earlier data on the °ows of funds are not available. I assume that the proportion of stocks held
by taxable investors between 1917 and 1944 equals the proportion in 1945.
12Chaplinsky and Seyhun (1990) examine the aggregate dividend tax savings provided to individ-





t =T) capital gains over the whole sample period. Thus, this alternative
de¯nition ignores an important determinant of the e®ective tax rates of equity secu-
rities and biases our results against ¯nding an impact of taxes on asset valuations.
Thus, this second measure of the e®ective tax rate only re°ects the changes in the
average capital gains and dividend tax rates. Most empirical results in Section 4 use
this alternative de¯nition of the e®ective tax rate.
Figure 6 summarizes the e®ective tax rate of equity securities over the sample
between 1917-2004. The more volatile curve corresponds to the de¯nition given in
equation (11), whereas the more stable curve corresponds to the de¯nition given
in equation (12). About one-quarter of the variation of the e®ective tax rate with
variable distribution weights is caused by changes in the dividend yield over time.
The e®ective tax rate using variable distribution weights decreased signi¯cantly since
the mid-1950s. The e®ective tax rate of stocks amounted to more than 40 percent in
1950 and decreased to 5.2 percent in 2004. The next section investigates empirically
whether there is a relationship between the e®ective tax rates and the asset valuation
levels.
4 Taxes and Asset Valuations
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 indicates that higher tax rates are asso-
ciated with lower asset valuations and higher asset returns. This section studies the
relationship between tax rates and asset valuations using the time-series variation in
e®ective tax rates.
It should be kept in mind that the tax rate of the marginal investor will in general
be di®erent from the e®ective tax rate computed previously. However, the measure-
ment error introduced by the fact that the tax rate of the marginal investor is not
observable will make it more di±cult to reject the hypothesis that taxes have no
17impact on asset valuations.
An additional caveat is that taxes are determined in an endogenous political pro-
cess and might therefore depend on the economic environment in general and the
stock market performance in particular. It is not possible to conclusively determine
the causality of the e®ects described in this paper. However, the multivariate regres-
sions include additional control variables that should capture the direct impact of
these variables on asset valuations.
4.1 Macroeconomic Data
This section uses an updated version of the data set in Shiller (1989) covering the
period between 1917 and 2004. The data are described in more detail in Appendix B.
Table 1 lists summary statistics for the data used. Panel A summarizes the tax
variables. The ¯rst row summarizes the moments of the e®ective tax rate using
constant weights, as de¯ned in equation (12). The second row reports the e®ective
tax rate based on the time-varying dividend yields, as de¯ned in equation (11). The
next two rows summarize the average marginal tax rates on dividends and long-term
capital gains, as depicted in Figure 4. The last three rows summarize statutory federal
tax rates on dividends for households in three di®erent income brackets, corresponding
to Adjusted Gross Incomes of $100,000, $250,000, and the maximum income levels
in 2004 U.S. dollars. The tax variables di®er in their general levels, but they are
generally highly correlated with the exception of the average marginal tax rate on
long-term capital gains.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes macroeconomic variables. The ¯rst three variables
are proxies of aggregate equity valuations. The price-earnings and the price-dividend
ratios are de¯ned as the S&P index level in January of the following year divided
by the earnings and the dividends in the current year. Tobin's q is de¯ned follow-
ing Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) as the ratio between the market value of
18equity and debt divided by the replacement cost of capital in the non¯nancial cor-
porate sector. The price-earnings ratio has a mean of 15.46 over the whole period
and varies between 5.63 (1917) and 46.18 (2001). The price-earnings ratio is highly
correlated with the two alternative valuations measures: The correlation with the
price-dividend ratio is 78.9 percent, and the correlation with Tobin's q is 71.7 per-
cent. The Appendix describes the derivation of these macroeconomic variables in
more detail. All three valuation measures have a signi¯cantly negative correlation
with the e®ective tax rate, consistent with a plausible calibration in the theoretical
model from Section 2.
The table summarizes additional macroeconomic variables, such as the nominal
return of the S&P 500 Index, the in°ation rate, the real per capita growth rate, the
interest rate, and indicator variables for whether the president is a±liated with the
Democratic party and for whether the current year is an NBER recession or war
year. There is a strong association between taxes and years of war, since taxes were
often increased during war periods to pay for the additional government spending.
Furthermore, tax rates also tend to be higher under Democratic administrations.
However, I do not ¯nd a signi¯cant relationship between the tax rate and the output
growth rate and the recession indicator variable, indicating that the short-term growth
rate of the economy does not appear to be very sensitive to the e®ective tax rate.
Since the price-earnings ratio is highly persistent, it is important to test whether it
follows a unit root. A Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root in the price-earnings ratio (and
in the logarithm of the price-earnings ratio) can be rejected at the one percent level.13
In the subsequent estimations, I will take into account the high autocorrelation of the
dependent variable by computing Newey-West standard errors.
Figure 7 depicts the time-series of the price-earnings, the price-dividend, and
13The Dickey-Fuller test statistic equals 3.882, which is larger than the 1 percent critical level.
Moreover, a regression of the di®erence in the price-earnings ratio on the lagged value of the price-
earnings ratio has a coe±cient of -0.291 with a standard error of 0.075. Thus, the process of the
price-earnings ratio is signi¯cantly di®erent from a unit root.
19Tobin's q ratio over the period between 1917 and 2004. The valuation levels vary
considerably through time. We observe that asset valuations were relatively low in
the early 1950s and in the late 1970s, time periods where taxes were relatively high.
On the other hand, asset valuations were relatively high in the 1960s and the 1990s,
when e®ective taxes were relatively low.
To investigate in more detail the relationship between asset valuations and taxes, I
summarize in Table 2 the average e®ective tax rate and the three valuations measures
for 15 distinct tax regimes. To determine the relationship between taxes and asset
valuations, I compute the Spearman rank correlation, which is simply the Pearson
correlation coe±cient based on the ranks of the average tax rates and the valuation
levels in the di®erent tax regimes. One advantage of the Spearman rank correla-
tion relative to the Pearson correlation coe±cient summarized in Table 1 is that the
Spearman correlation is not in°uenced as much by outliers. The results indicate that
there is generally a negative correlation between asset valuations and tax regimes.
The remainder of this paper will investigate this relationship in more detail using
multivariate regressions.
4.2 Regression Speci¯cation
The correlations in Tables 1 and 2 show a negative relationship between taxes and
asset valuations. It is possible that omitted variables a®ect the tax rates and the
asset valuations, thereby causing a bias in the coe±cient estimates. This section
shows that e®ective tax rates remain an important determinant of asset valuations
even if additional macroeconomic variables are included.
There are many other factors that a®ect asset valuations besides taxes. The level
of interest rates has an important impact on asset valuations, since stocks and ¯xed-
income securities are alternative investment options. As interest rates increase, stock
valuations should decline to generate higher expected returns as long as risk premia
20remain una®ected.
A second factor besides the short-term interest rate in determining the discount
rate of equity securities is the equity risk premium. The risk premium depends on the
risk-aversion of investors and on the anticipated amount of risk during the next time
period. Four macroeconomic variables, the in°ation rate, the per-capital growth rate
in output, an indicator variable for a recession, and an indicator variable for a time
period of war, attempt to capture this e®ect on asset valuations. Uncertainty tends
to be larger during periods of high in°ation and low growth rates, particularly during
wars and recessions. Thus, it should be expected that asset valuations are lower with
high in°ation, low growth rates, in recessions, and in times of war. However, such cri-
sis times also might be time periods where earnings or dividends are temporarily low.
Thus, if this e®ect dominates the risk-premium e®ect, then there should be a positive
relationship between asset valuation levels and these macroeconomic variables.14
The party of the president is included as an additional explanatory variable, since
tax levels tend to be higher during Democratic administrations, as shown in Table 1.
An impact of the party of the president on asset pricing has been previously investi-
gated by Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2002), who show that asset returns tend to be
higher under Democratic presidents.
Finally, I also include a linear time trend to capture omitted variables that change
linearly with time. For example, the risk tolerance might have increased over time
justifying higher stock valuations in the last part of our sample. The time trend
also can capture some tax e®ects. McDonald (2004) shows that ¯nancial innovations
introduced during the last several decades allow investors e®ectively to avoid the
taxation of dividends and capital gains. Thus, increasing valuation ratios also could
result from such ¯nancial innovations.
14In the empirical estimation section, I will include several robustness tests to investigate these
issues more fully. For example, following Campbell and Shiller (1998), I will compute the moving
average of earnings over the previous ¯ve and ten years to mitigate the impact of temporary cyclical
variations in earnings.
21The relationship between asset valuations and e®ective taxes is estimated using
the following regression equation:
pt=et = ®0 + ®1¿
const
t + ®2rft + ®3¼t + ®4gt
+®5demt + ®6rect + ®7wart + ®8t + ²t: (13)
The dependent variable in the base case is de¯ned as the ratio between the index
value of the Standard and Poor's Composite Index pt at the end of the year divided
by the earnings of companies in the underlying index et during the corresponding
year. The independent variables in the base case are measured in the current year:
The e®ective tax rate with constant distribution weights is denoted by ¿const
t ; the
short-term interest rate by rft; the in°ation rate by ¼t; the real per capita growth
rate by gt; an indicator variable for a Democratic president by demt; an indicator
variable for an NBER recession by rect; an indicator variable for a year of war by
wart; and a linear time trend by t.15 If taxes are capitalized into asset prices, then
the tax coe±cient ®1 should be negative.
4.3 Regression Estimates
Table 3 summarizes the results of the main speci¯cation in this section. The ¯rst col-
umn reports the regression results for a univariate regression, and the second column
includes additional macroeconomic control variables and a linear time trend.
The standard errors are given in parentheses and follow Newey and West (1987),
where the autocorrelation structure is estimated using a four-year lag. A four-year
lag is chosen because the autocorrelations of the price-earnings ratio up to a lag of
15The empirical speci¯cation does not include the corporate tax rate as an additional explanatory
variable. Corporate taxes should not a®ect asset valuations in steady-state since the earnings are
measured after the deduction of the corporation tax. The correlation between the corporate and the
personal tax rates is relatively high (0.63), resulting in insigni¯cant coe±cients on the tax variables
if both variables are included.
22four years are statistically signi¯cant. The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with
asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote statistical signi¯cance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent level, respectively.16
The results on the tax coe±cient are both economically and statistically signi¯-
cant. For example, the second column shows in the multi-variate analysis that a one
percentage point increase in the e®ective tax rate reduces the price-earnings ratio by
0.35, or by about 2.3 percent of the mean price-earnings ratio.
The interest rate and the in°ation rate also have an important impact on asset
valuations. Asset valuation levels tend to be lower when nominal interest rates are
higher and when in°ation rates are higher. The other macroeconomic variables are
less important. Finally, the regression detects a statistically signi¯cant positive time
trend.
4.4 Robustness Tests
This section tests for the robustness of the previously described results using di®erent
measures of stock valuations, di®erent tax rates, and alternative speci¯cations.
The endogeneity of taxes might be one issue of the base-case regression estimation.
Whereas the numerator p is measured at the beginning of the following year, the
denominator e is measured simultaneously with the explanatory variables. To avoid
any issues of reverse causality, Table 4 reports in the second column the regression
results, where the dependent variable is measured in the subsequent year. However,
neither the economic nor the statistical signi¯cance of the tax coe±cient is a®ected
using this alternative speci¯cation.
16The Newey-West standard errors are signi¯cantly higher than the OLS standard errors. For
example, the OLS standard error of the tax variable in the second column of Table 3 would have been
only 10.30. However, increasing the number of lags beyond four does not increase the standard errors.
For example, the standard errors with eight lags are 11.86, compared to 12.84 in the speci¯cation
with four lags. Thus, the choice of the lag length corresponds to the most conservative Newey-West
standard errors.
23The derivation of the e®ective tax rates requires many speci¯c assumptions. Ta-
ble 5 analyzes whether the impact of taxes is robust if we use alternative tax rates.
The ¯rst column repeats the regression results from Table 3. The second column
de¯nes the e®ective tax rate as in equation (11) and allows the distribution weights
to vary over time. The coe±cient on the tax variable becomes slightly more negative
and more statistically signi¯cant under this speci¯cation. This con¯rms the expec-
tation that the results in the base case using e®ective tax rates based on constant
distribution weights are more conservative.
The third column uses the average marginal tax rate on dividends. This tax
rate ignores the composition of the returns between dividends and capital gains and
regresses the valuation ratios on the average dividend tax rate, as summarized in
Figure 4. The coe±cient estimate decreases because the tax rate of dividends is more
variable than the e®ective tax rate. However, the statistical signi¯cance increases in
this speci¯cation slightly relative to the base case summarized in the ¯rst column.
The last three columns use the marginal statutory federal tax rates on dividends
for investors with real income levels of $100,000, $250,000, and the top tax rate.
Under all three cases, there is a negative relationship, which is at least statistically
signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent con¯dence level. The level of the coe±cient estimates
di®ers between the various speci¯cations, which should be expected since the di®erent
tax variables have very di®erent standard deviations, as summarized in Table 1.
These results indicate that the results are robust to alternative de¯nitions of the
relevant tax rate. These robustness tests are important because the tax rate of the
marginal investor cannot be observed. Therefore, it is crucial that the results are not
driven by an arbitrary choice of the e®ective tax rate.
Table 6 analyzes the relationship between the e®ective tax rate on equity and
di®erent valuation measures. The ¯rst column repeats the estimates in the base
case using the price-earnings ratio as the dependent variable. The second and third
24columns use the ratio of the current S&P 500 Index value divided by the moving
average of the real earnings during the previous ¯ve and ten years, respectively. By
averaging earnings over several years it is possible to partially isolate variations in the
stock valuations from short-term variations in earnings due to the business cycle, as
discussed by Campbell and Shiller (1998). The fourth column uses the price-dividend
ratio as the dependent variable, and the ¯fth column uses Tobin's q measure. Our
results remain robust using these various valuation measures. In fact, the relationship
between asset valuations and taxes is substantially more statistically signi¯cant using
Tobin's q measure than in the base case. This result might be caused by the fact that
earnings and dividends are more noisy normalization measures.
Table 7 tests whether the results change using di®erent transformations of the
valuation and the tax variables. The ¯rst column repeats the results for the base-case
speci¯cation, and the last column reports the results for a logarithmic speci¯cation. A
logarithmic speci¯cation might be more easily interpretable. For example, a coe±cient
of one implies a complete tax capitalization. Such a relationship would be consistent
with a general equilibrium model without tax changes as shown in Proposition 2.17
The results of this logarithmic speci¯cation in the fourth column are consistent
with the base-case speci¯cation. Whereas the coe±cient estimate in the fourth column
is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from one. This
indicates that it is not possible to reject a complete tax capitalization using the
e®ective tax rates as the relevant measure of the aggregate tax burden.
17Proposition 2 indicates in a model with stationary taxes that the price-dividend ratio is ± =
(1 ¡ ¿)¯°=(1 ¡ ¯°). Suppose that the dividend-payout ratio is constant over time d=e = µ. Then
the price-earnings ratio is p=e = (1 ¡ ¿)¯°µ=(1 ¡ ¯°). Taking logarithms of this relationship gives:
ln(p=e) = ln(1¡¿)+ln(¯°=(1¡¯°)), which has the same relationship between valuation levels and
taxes as equation (13). A similar relationship occurs in the more general model with tax changes if
® = 1. However, the coe±cient will di®er from one if ® 6= 1 and if Á < 1, as shown in Proposition 3.
254.5 Equity Returns
This section includes one additional test that investigates the relationship between
taxes and asset returns. Proposition 4 indicates that under plausible conditions ex-
pected asset returns should be higher in periods of high tax rates. To test whether
equity returns are higher during periods of high taxes, I run the following regression:
rt = ®0 + ®1¿t + ®2rft + ®3¼t + ®4gt +
®5demt + ®6rect + ®7wart + ®8t + ²t: (14)
The nominal return of the S&P Composite index in year t is denoted by rt, and
the additional control variables are de¯ned as in the previous section. This empirical
test uses the e®ective tax rate with time-varying distribution weights as de¯ned in
equation (11), because there is no issue of a spurious correlation if the dependent
variable is the asset return. The ¯rst column of Table 8 summarizes the coe±cient
estimates using the contemporaneous return as the dependent variable. The results
indicate a statistically signi¯cant relationship between taxes and asset returns. Av-
erage stock returns tend to be higher in periods of higher tax rates, consistent with
the hypothesis that investors are compensated for higher taxes with higher average
returns. Thus, before-tax asset returns are higher and asset valuations are lower in
periods of relatively higher tax burdens. The higher asset returns during high-tax
regimes are simply a consequence of the lower asset valuations.
The second column uses the return in the following year as the dependent variable
to avoid any issues of endogeneity. This second speci¯cation is related to the literature
in ¯nance on the predictability of asset returns.18
The coe±cients on the tax rates are economically very large. For example, a
one percentage point increase in the e®ective tax rate increases asset returns by
18See, for example, Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988), Stambaugh (1999) for
a discussion of this literature.
26between 0.50 and 0.61 percentage points per year. However, the standard errors
of this speci¯cation are also large, resulting in test statistics with relatively poor
power. To increase the power of the tests, one could either increase the number of
observations or extend the data set by including some cross-sectional variation. The
¯rst strategy of increasing the number of observations is not feasible since tax data
are only available over the last century. However, Sialm (2005b) divides up the stocks
traded on the major U.S. stock exchanges between 1926 and 2004 into portfolios
according to their lagged dividend yield, generating portfolios that should be a®ected
di®erentially by the time-variations in tax rates, and shows that taxes have a more
signi¯cant impact for high-dividend stocks that tend to be taxed more heavily. These
panel results con¯rm the hypothesis that taxes have an impact on abnormal asset
returns.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the e®ective taxation of equity securities and studies whether
personal taxes are capitalized in asset prices. The e®ective personal taxation of
equity securities °uctuated considerably since federal taxes were introduced in 1913.
The e®ective tax rate of stocks decreased over the last 50 years, because statutory tax
rates decreased, because the dividend yield decreased, and because a larger fraction of
stocks is held today in tax-exempt accounts. The U.S. tax system on equity securities
moved gradually from an income-tax system toward a consumption-tax system.
The paper proposes a new empirical test based on the time-series variation in tax
burdens to study whether equity taxes are priced. The empirical estimations indicate
that aggregate stock valuations tend to be relatively high and asset returns relatively
low when taxes are low. This relationship remains robust after controlling for addi-
tional macroeconomic variables. These results con¯rm the results of McGrattan and
27Prescott (2005), who ¯nd in a calibrated growth model that asset valuations increased
signi¯cantly between 1960-2000 due to various tax and regulatory reforms.
Taxes appear to be one of the factors that drive valuation levels of the aggregate
stock market. It must be kept in mind that taxes do not explain all the variation
in asset valuations and that changes in risk, changes in risk-aversion, and changes in
investor sentiment probably also account for a signi¯cant portion of the variability in
asset valuations over the last century.
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32A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The price-dividend ratio from equation (9) can be expressed as:
±H = ¯° [Á(±H + (1 ¡ ¿H)) + (1 ¡ Á)(±L + (1 ¡ ¿L))´]; (15)
±L = ¯° [Á(±L + (1 ¡ ¿L)) + (1 ¡ Á)(±H + (1 ¡ ¿H))=´]: (16)
where ° = Et [(dt+1=dt)1¡®] = exp((1 ¡ ®)¹ + 0:5(1 ¡ ®)2¾2) and ´ = [(1 ¡
¿L)=(1¡¿H)]¡®. This simpli¯cation is possible because of the independence between
the tax and the dividend process.
Equations (15) and (16) can be solved in closed form for the two price-dividend
ratios. These equations can be written in matrix form, where ± = [±H ±L]0:




1 ¡ ¯°Á ¡¯°(1 ¡ Á)´





¯° (Á(1 ¡ ¿H) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿L)´)
¯° (Á(1 ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿H)=´)
¸
:
The price-dividend ratio can be solved in closed form if A is nonsingular. The
determinant jAj is:




= (1 ¡ ¯°)[(1 ¡ ¯°Á) + ¯°(1 ¡ Á)]:
The determinant jAj is strictly positive whenever 0 < ¯° < 1. As long as risk-
aversion and the moments of the growth rate are ¯nite, ¯° = ¯ exp[(1¡®)¹+0:5(1¡
®)2¾2] > 0. Furthermore, the transversality condition (7) is violated if ¯° ¸ 1. Thus,
for prices to be ¯nite, we need to require that ¯° < 1.
The closed-form solutions for the price-dividend ratios are:
± = A
¡1b: (18)
The price-dividend ratios in the two regimes are as follows:
±H =
¯° [(Á(1 ¡ ¯°) + (1 ¡ Á)(¯°))(1 ¡ ¿H) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿L)´]
(1 ¡ ¯°)[(1 ¡ ¯°Á) + ¯°(1 ¡ Á)]
; (19)
±L =
¯° [(Á(1 ¡ ¯°) + (1 ¡ Á)(¯°))(1 ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿H)=´]
(1 ¡ ¯°)[(1 ¡ ¯°Á) + ¯°(1 ¡ Á)]
: (20)
The price-dividend ratios are strictly positive whenever 0 < ¯° < 1.
33Next, I compare the valuation levels in the two regimes. The denominators are
identical for the two valuation ratios. The ¯rst term in brackets for equation (19) is
smaller than the ¯rst term for equation (20) (Á(1 ¡ ¯°) + (1 ¡ Á)(¯°))(1 ¡ ¿H) <
(Á(1¡¯°)+(1¡Á)(¯°))(1¡¿L), as long as ¿H > ¿L. The second term in brackets for
equation (19) is smaller than the second term for equation (20) if ® > 0:5. Note that
(1 ¡ ¿L)´ = (1 ¡ ¿L)[(1 ¡ ¿L)=(1 ¡ ¿H)]¡® = (1 ¡ ¿L)1¡®(1 ¡ ¿H)® and (1 ¡ ¿H)=´ =
(1¡¿H)[(1¡¿H)=(1¡¿L)]¡® = (1¡¿H)1¡®(1¡¿L)®. The second term is identical in
the two equations if ® = 0:5 and is smaller in equation (19) if ® > 0:5. Thus, ±H < ±L
if ® > 0:5.
To show the general conditions for the asset valuations in the two tax regimes, we
only need to take into account the numerators of equations (19) and (20), since the
denominators are identical and positive. The inequality ±H Q ±L results if:
(Á(1 ¡ ¯°) + (1 ¡ Á)(¯°))(1 ¡ ¿H) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿L)´
Q (Á(1 ¡ ¯°) + (1 ¡ Á)(¯°))(1 ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿H)=´:
It is possible to re-write this inequality using:
Á(x + y) Q x;
where:
x = ¯°(¿H ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ ¿H)=´ ¡ (1 ¡ ¿L)´;
y = ¯°(¿H ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ ¿H) ¡ (1 ¡ ¿L):
Note that y is always negative since y = ¯°(¿H ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ ¿H) ¡ (1 ¡ ¿L) =
(¯° ¡ 1)(¿H ¡ ¿L). Also note that y · x since ´ = ((1 ¡ ¿L)=(1 ¡ ¿H))¡® · 1.
We need to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether x+y is positive
or negative. Case 1 has x + y < 0. In this case, ±H Q ±L if Á R x=(x + y). If x < 0,
then x=(x + y) > 0 and since y · x it must be that x=(x + y) · 0:5. On the other
hand, if x > 0, then x=(x + y) < 0 and ±H < ±L for all probabilities Á 2 [0;1].
Case 2 has x+y ¸ 0. In this case, ±H Q ±L if Á Q x=(x+y). Since x+y ¸ 0 and
y < 0, it must be that x > 0. Thus, x=(x + y) > 1 and ±H < ±L for all probabilities
Á 2 [0;1].
Thus, these results indicate that ±H < ±L for all cases, except for the case where
x < 0 and Á < x=(x+y) · 0:5. Thus, ±H Q ±L if Á R ~ Á, where the critical persistence
level is de¯ned as:
~ Á =
½
¡1 if x + y ¸ 0
x=(x + y) if x + y < 0
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2























A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Equations (19) and (20) describe the asset valuations in the two states. The ratio of




(Á(1 ¡ ¯°) + (1 ¡ Á)(¯°))(1 ¡ ¿L) + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¿H)=´






















Note that if ® Q 1, then [(1¡¿L)=(1¡¿H)]1¡® R 1 and [(1¡¿H)=(1¡¿L)]1¡® Q 1.
Thus, the numerator in brackets is smaller (larger) than the denominator whenever
® < 1 (® > 1). With log-utility (® = 1), the ratio between the two prices is just
±L=±H = (1 ¡ ¿L)=(1 ¡ ¿H).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4





















where » = Et [(dt+1=dt)] = exp(¹ + 0:5¾2).
Equations (22) and (23) describe expected returns in the two states. If ±H Q ±L
then (±H + 1)=±H R (±L + 1)=±L and (±L + 1)=±H R (±H + 1)=±L. Thus, if ±H Q ±L
then ¸H R ¸L.
B Data
This section explains in more detail the computation of the e®ective tax rates.
B.1 Statutory Tax Rates
Taxable income is derived for ¯ve real income levels after deducting exemptions for a
married couple ¯ling jointly with two dependent children from the ¯xed income levels.
The proportion of total deductions relative to the adjusted gross income is assumed
to equal the proportion of total deductions in the whole population for each year as
reported by the Internal Revenue Service.
35The marginal income tax brackets and exemptions are determined using the Statis-
tics of Income of the Internal Revenue Service (1954) for the years 1913-1943, Pechman
(1987) for the years 1944-1987, and di®erent issues of the Instructions to Form 1040
from the IRS for the remaining years between 1988-2004. The values of the Consumer
Price Index from 1913-1957 are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.19 Total
deductions as a proportion of adjusted gross income (AGI) are derived from di®erent
issues of the Statistics of Income of the IRS. Marginal income tax rates for individ-
uals in ¯ve di®erent tax brackets corresponding to Adjusted Gross Income levels of
50, 100, 250, 500 thousand U.S. dollars (with 2004 consumer prices), as well as the
highest marginal income tax rate are derived.
The long-term capital gains tax rate applies to realized gains with a holding period
of more than ¯ve years. The data source for the capital gains tax rates for 1913-1950
is the Synopsis of Federal Tax Laws from the Statistics of Income for 1950. The
remaining tax rates are taken from di®erent issues of the General Explanations of
Tax Legislation by the Joint Committee on Taxation (1998) and Table 2-4 from
Burman (1999).
B.2 Average Marginal Tax Rates
The time series for the average marginal tax rates of dividends, capital gains, interest
income, and wage income are computed using di®erent annual issues of the Statistics
of Income between 1917 and 1964 and the average marginal tax rates from the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research between 1965-2004. Post-2001 data is derived
from the 2000 Tax Model, since these years are not yet available from the SOI. How-
ever, the data includes the impact of EGGTRA and JGTRRA and re°ects therefore
the tax changes through January 2005. The NBER publishes average marginal tax
rates for selected income sources since 1960 using their Taxsim software.20
The NBER publishes average marginal tax rates that include state and local taxes.
For the early data, I use the National Income and Product Accounts published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis to determine the state and local tax rates. The BEA
summarizes the current personal income tax receipts of state and local governments
(Table 3.3) and the federal government (Table 3.2).21 I assume that the state and
local government tax rate is a ¯xed proportion of the federal tax rate according to
the annual revenues.
The proportion of equity held in taxable accounts is estimated using the Flow
of Funds published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank.22 The
proportion is only computed for equities held by domestic investors, since it would be
impossible to determine the marginal tax rates faced by international stock investors.
The detailed derivation of the time series is available upon request. The °ow of funds
publishes this distribution of equity holdings only between 1945 and 2001. The values
prior to 1945 and after 2001 are taken from the most recent available year.
19Data can be found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm.
20The time series can be downloaded from http://www.nber.org/»taxsim.
21The data can be downloaded from http://www.bea.gov.
22The data can be downloaded from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/.
36The tax rates ¿div, ¿scg, and ¿lcg from equations (11) and (12) are computed by
multiplying the average marginal tax rates of taxable investors given in Figure 4 with
the proportion of equity held in taxable accounts. This assumes that assets held in
retirement accounts and by tax-exempt institutions face a zero e®ective tax rate.23
B.3 Distributions of Dividends and Capital Gains
The proportion of dividend distributions wdiv
t is computed as the ratio of the dividend
yield ydiv








The average proportion of dividend distributions equals 43.06 percent and ranges
between 11.85 (1999) and 85.45 (1950) percent.




t are de¯ned as the
product between the dividend yield ydiv
t and the ratio between the short- and long-
term realized capital gains SCGt and LCGt divided by the total dividend payments

















The annual Statistics of Income of the Internal Revenue Service report for most
years in our sample the total short- and long-term capital gains and the dividends
declared by individuals. The capital gains given by the Statistics of Income include
capital gains from many sources and not just from stock transactions. The IRS does
unfortunately not report every year the proportion of capital gains that result from
transactions of corporate equities. However, for eight years between 1959 and 2004,
the IRS reported the sources of capital gains in more detail. On average, about 35
percent of the capital gains result from transactions of corporate equity. I interpolated
the fraction of stock capital gains using these eight years.
The average value of the proportion of short-term capital gains is -1.38, and the
proportion of long-term capital gains equals 24.96 percent. On average, 66.64 percent
of the expected real returns are either realized as dividends or as capital gains.
The capital gains realizations vary substantially through time. For example, long-
23Asset returns remain untaxed in tax-preferred accounts, such as ROTH-IRA accounts, as long
as investors do not take non-quali¯ed distributions. However, the returns in tax-deferred savings
accounts, such as regular IRAs and 401(k) accounts, are not completely tax-exempt. Contributions
to tax-deferred accounts are deducted from taxable income while the total withdrawals are taxed at
the ordinary income tax rate. If investors remain in the same tax bracket throughout their lifetimes,
then savings in a tax-deferred account accumulate completely tax-free. If investors are in a lower
(higher) tax bracket during retirement compared to before retirement, then they face e®ectively
negative (positive) taxes on their accumulated savings in a tax-deferred account.
37term capital gains are extremely high in 1986, before the enactment of the TRA of
1986, where capital gains taxes were increased from 20 to 28 percent. Moreover,
short-term capital loss realizations are relatively high in the early 2000s due to the
large decline in stock prices during that period. To eliminate the impact of these
high-frequency changes in capital gains realization, it is assumed that investors have
a ¯xed propensity to realize capital gains and capital losses over the sample period





















1 ¡ wdiv; (28)
where wdiv denotes the average proportion of returns distributed as dividends,
and ylcg and yscg denote the average long- and short-term capital gains yields over
the whole sample period. However, our regression results are not a®ected qualitatively











The S&P Composite Index Value, the corresponding dividend and earnings variables,
the consumer price index, and the interest rates series between 1913 and 2005 used in
Section 4 are taken from Robert Shiller's webpage.24 The stock prices are the average
values in January of the Standard and Poor's Composite index. The dividends and
the earnings per share are adjusted to the S&P Composite index (4 Quarter Total).
Tobin's q is computed following Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993). The nominal
output growth rate is computed using the growth rate in the GNP from Mitchell
(1983) prior to 1928 and the growth rate in the GDP from the BEA (Table 1.1 Line
1; http://www.bea.gov). The U.S. population prior to 1940 is taken from Dodd
(1993) and after 1939 from the BEA (Table 8.7 Line 16; http://www.bea.gov). The
party of the president was found on http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/.
The NBER recessions are obtained from http://www.nber.org/cycles/. World War I
(1914-1918), World War II (1941-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and the Viet-
nam War (1965-1972) are counted as war years.
24See http://aida.econ.yale.edu/»shiller/.
38Figure 1: Price-Dividend Ratio
These ¯gures depict the price-dividend ratio ± in the two tax regimes at four di®erent
risk-aversion levels.
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39Figure 2: Expected Asset Returns
These ¯gures depict the expected returns in the two tax regimes at four di®erent
risk-aversion levels.
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40Figure 3: Statutory Federal Marginal Income Tax Rates at Di®erent Real Income
Levels
The marginal income tax rates are depicted over the period from 1913 to 2004 for ¯ve
di®erent real income levels. The four lower curves correspond to the marginal income
tax rates for households with real income levels of 50, 100, 250, and 500 thousand
U.S. dollars expressed in 2004 consumer prices. The highest curve corresponds to the
maximum marginal income tax rate.



































41Figure 4: Average Marginal Investment Income Tax Rates for Taxable Investors
The dollar-weighted average marginal tax rates for taxable investors on dividend
income and capital gains are depicted between 1917 and 2004. The tax rates include
taxes imposed by state and local governments.




































42Figure 5: Dividend and Capital Gains Realizations
These ¯gures depict the total dividend and the capital gains realizations on the U.S.
stock market divided by the initial market capitalization.
Dividend Yield Capital Gains Yield




























































3Figure 6: E®ective Tax Rate on Stock Returns
This ¯gure depicts the e®ective tax rates for all stocks. The more volatile curve
corresponds to the e®ective tax rate with time-varying distribution weights, and the
more stable curve corresponds to the e®ective tax rate with constant distribution
weights.











































44Figure 7: Asset Valuations
The price-earnings, the price-dividend, and Tobin's q ratio are depicted over the
period from 1917-2004.






































5Table 1: Summary Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables
This table summarizes the means and the standard deviations of various tax rates and
macroeconomic variables between 1917-2004. The third column shows the correlation
between the corresponding variable and the e®ective tax rate.
Mean Std. Dev. Correlation
Panel A: Tax Variables
E®ective Tax Rate with Constant Weights 17:68 6:30 100
E®ective Tax Rate with Time-Varying Weights 18:05 8:21 87:29¤¤¤
Average Marginal Tax on Dividends 33:45 11:75 91:55¤¤¤
Average Marginal Tax on Capital Gains 18:25 4:77 21:12¤
Income Tax Rate (Income of $100,000) 21:27 11:07 56:88¤¤¤
Income Tax Rate (Income of $250,000) 34:71 16:55 80:62¤¤¤
Income Tax Rate (Maximum Income) 63:30 22:65 86:19¤¤¤
Panel B: Macroeconomic Variables
P-E Ratio 15:46 7:19 ¡28:86¤¤¤
P-D Ratio 28:52 15:52 ¡24:42¤¤
Tobin's q 0:80 0:38 ¡38:13¤¤¤
Nominal S&P Composite Return 11:86 19:02 5:61
In°ation Rate 3:36 5:28 29:08¤¤¤
Real Per Capita Growth Rate 1:99 6:81 15:56
Nominal Interest Rate 4:73 3:33 ¡13:97¤¤
Democrat President Indicator Variable 50:00 50:29 28:60¤¤¤
War Year Indicator Variable 21:59 41:38 48:45¤¤¤
Recession Year Indicator Variable 39:77 49:22 ¡8:21
46Table 2: Asset Valuations in Di®erent Tax Regimes
This table summarizes the e®ective tax rate using constant distribution weights, the
price-earnings ratio, the price-dividend ratio, and Tobin's q ratio for di®erent tax
regimes in our sample. The table also includes the Spearman rank correlations and
the corresponding p-values in parentheses. The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated
with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Time Period Tax Rate P-E Ratio P-D Ratio Tobin's q
1 1917-1923 12:81 11:29 14:97 0:43
2 1924-1931 8:06 13:71 20:07 0:83
3 1932-1935 13:15 19:56 22:00 0:75
4 1936-1939 15:75 15:11 20:73 1:10
5 1940-1947 25:65 12:12 19:04 0:66
6 1948-1950 22:72 7:15 15:25 0:49
7 1951-1963 24:62 14:97 26:52 0:63
8 1964-1968 22:35 17:53 32:79 0:94
9 1969-1981 22:16 11:80 25:23 0:57
10 1982-1986 14:66 13:22 25:11 0:54
11 1987-1992 12:99 17:57 30:78 0:89
12 1993-1996 13:06 18:67 42:22 1:20
13 1997-2000 12:77 28:40 76:61 1:90
14 2001-2002 11:62 39:33 64:08 1:39
15 2003-2004 7:58 20:27 62:44 1:40
Spearman Rank Correlation ¡0:55¤¤ ¡0:39 ¡0:52¤¤
P-Value (0:034) (0:148) (0:048)
47Table 3: Relationship Between Taxes and the Price-Earnings Ratio
This table summarizes the coe±cients of the following regression: pt=et = ®0 +
®1¿const
t +®2rft+®3¼t+®4gt+®5demt+®6rect+®7wart+®8t+²t, where pt=et is the
price of the Standard & Poor's Composite Index at the end of year t divided by the
earnings of the underlying stocks during year t; ¿const
t is the e®ective tax rate using
constant distribution weights; rft is the risk-free interest rate; ¼t is the in°ation rate;
gt is the per-capita real growth rate of GDP; demt is an indicator variable for whether
the president is a Democrat; rect is an indicator variable for whether the current year
is a recession year according to NBER; wart is an indicator variable for whether the
current year is a war year; and t is a linear time trend. The Newey-West standard
errors are summarized in parentheses and use a four-year lag. The signi¯cance levels
are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote signi¯cance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Univariate Multivariate
Estimates Estimates




















48Table 4: Relationship Between Taxes and the Price-Earnings Ratio
This table summarizes the coe±cients of the following regression: pt+k=et+k = ®0 +
®1¿const
t +®2rft+®3¼t+®4gt+®5demt+®6rect+®7wart+®8t+²t+k, where pt+k=et+k
is the price of the Standard & Poor's Composite Index at the end of year t+k divided
by the earnings of the underlying stocks during year t + k with k 2 (0;1); ¿const
t is
the e®ective tax rate using constant distribution weights; rft is the risk-free interest
rate; ¼t is the in°ation rate; gt is the per-capita real growth rate of GDP; demt is
an indicator variable for whether the president is a Democrat; rect is an indicator
variable for whether the current year is a recession year according to NBER; wart is
an indicator variable for whether the current year is a war year; and t is a linear time
trend. The ¯rst column reports the regression results using this year's price-earnings
ratio, while the second column reports the results using next year's price-earnings
ratio and the explanatory variables in the current year. The Newey-West standard
errors are summarized in parentheses and use a four-year lag. The signi¯cance levels
are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote signi¯cance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
This Year's Next Year's
Price-Earnings Ratio Price-Earnings Ratio
(pt=et) (pt+1=et+1)
E®ective Tax Rate ¡35:00¤¤¤ ¡41:50¤¤¤
(12:84) (15:32)
Interest Rate ¡71:74¤¤¤ ¡28:48
(22:75) (23:60)
In°ation Rate ¡32:38¤¤¤ ¡41:25¤¤¤
(11:85) (10:70)














49Table 5: Relationship Between Taxes and the Price-Earnings Ratio: Di®erent Tax
Rates
This table summarizes the coe±cients of the following regression: pt=et = ®0+®1¿t+
®2rft+®3¼t+®4gt+®5demt+®6rect+®7wart+®8t+²t, where pt=et the price of the
Standard & Poor's Composite Index at the end of year t divided by the earnings of
the underlying stocks during year t; ¿t is tax rate; rft is the risk-free interest rate; ¼t
is the in°ation rate; gt is the per-capita real growth rate of GDP; demt is an indicator
variable for whether the president is a Democrat; rect is an indicator variable for
whether the current year is a recession year according to NBER; wart is an indicator
variable for whether the current year is a war year; and t is a linear time trend.
The di®erent columns represent coe±cient estimates using di®erent tax rates. The
Newey-West standard errors are summarized in parentheses and use a four-year lag.
The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks
denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
E®ective Tax Rates Statutory Tax Rates
Constant Varying Div- $100,000 $250,000 Maximum
Weights Weights idends
Tax Rate ¡35:00¤¤¤ ¡42:70¤¤¤ ¡19:62¤¤¤ ¡25:38¤¤ ¡14:57¤¤¤ ¡6:48¤¤
(12:84) (8:85) (6:87) (10:22) (5:28) (3:23)
Interest Rate ¡71:74¤¤¤ ¡75:78¤¤¤ ¡64:02¤¤¤ ¡52:08¤¤ ¡55:32¤¤ ¡66:94¤¤¤
(22:75) (19:02) (21:40) (22:16) (21:36) (23:83)
In°ation Rate ¡32:38¤¤¤ ¡26:04¤¤ ¡32:00¤¤¤ ¡31:70¤¤ ¡31:56¤¤ ¡36:63¤¤¤
(11:85) (10:77) (11:99) (13:34) (12:45) (12:31)
Growth Rate ¡11:74 ¡11:85 ¡11:24 ¡15:45 ¡13:82 ¡10:82
(11:11) (10:00) (11:09) (11:20) (11:09) (11:50)
Democrat 1:06 1:57 1:20 0:74 0:75 1:29
(1:51) (1:24) (1:47) (1:47) (1:49) (1:55)
Recession 1:62 1:94 1:51 1:02 1:22 1:58
(2:00) (1:87) (1:97) (1:96) (1:99) (2:02)
War 2:30 3:33¤¤¤ 1:98 1:73 2:05 0:98
(1:62) (1:16) (1:48) (1:35) (1:50) (1:63)
Time Trend 0:18¤¤¤ 0:15¤¤¤ 0:20¤¤¤ 0:24¤¤¤ 0:21¤¤¤ 0:15¤¤¤
(0:05) (0:04) (0:05) (0:06) (0:05) (0:05)
Constant 17:01¤¤¤ 19:02¤¤¤ 15:83¤¤¤ 13:11¤¤¤ 13:93¤¤¤ 16:02¤¤¤
(2:33) (2:04) (2:28) (2:31) (2:23) (2:49)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0:49 0:59 0:49 0:48 0:49 0:45
50Table 6: Relationship Between Taxes and Asset Valuation: Various Valuation Ratios
This table summarizes the coe±cients of the following regression: valt = ®0 +
®1¿const
t + ®2rft + ®3¼t + ®4gt + ®5demt + ®6rect + ®7wart + ®8t + ²t, where valt
is the valuation ratio at the end of year t; ¿const
t is the e®ective tax rate using con-
stant distribution weights; rft is the risk-free interest rate; ¼t is the in°ation rate; gt
is the per-capita real growth rate of GDP; demt is an indicator variable for whether
the president is a Democrat; rect is an indicator variable for whether the current year
is a recession year according to NBER; wart is an indicator variable for whether the
current year is a war year; and t is a linear time trend. The Newey-West standard
errors are summarized in parentheses and use a four-year lag. The results using var-
ious valuation ratios are summarized in the columns: (1) price earnings ratio; (2)
price earnings ratio where the earnings are de¯ned as the average earnings over the
previous ¯ve years; (3) price earnings ratio where the earnings are de¯ned as the
average earnings over the previous ten years; (4) price dividend ratio; (5) Tobin's
q ratio. The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three
asterisks denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Equity Valuation Ratios
PE Ratio PE5 Ratio PE10 Ratio PD Ratio Tobin's q
E®ective Tax Rate ¡35:00¤¤¤ ¡29:94¤¤¤ ¡33:42¤¤ ¡82:63¤¤¤ ¡3:08¤¤¤
(12:84) (11:03) (15:43) (30:27) (0:61)
Interest Rate ¡71:74¤¤¤ ¡63:48¤¤¤ ¡54:09¤ ¡132:21¤¤¤ ¡3:84¤¤¤
(22:75) (20:50) (27:51) (39:21) (1:08)
In°ation Rate ¡32:38¤¤¤ ¡21:44¤ ¡24:60¤ ¡23:48 ¡1:18
(11:85) (11:70) (14:31) (21:32) (0:73)
Growth Rate ¡11:74 10:20 2:84 0:18 0:75
(11:11) (9:92) (9:28) (16:27) (0:50)
Democrat 1:06 2:26 3:03 4:09 0:21¤¤
(1:51) (1:66) (2:40) (4:35) (0:11)
Recession 1:62 ¡0:12 0:10 1:51 0:07
(2:00) (1:20) (1:35) (2:65) (0:08)
War 2:30 0:11 2:17 3:03 0:07
(1:62) (1:90) (1:71) (2:77) (0:09)
Time Trend 0:18¤¤¤ 0:19¤¤¤ 0:24¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:01¤¤¤
(0:05) (0:03) (0:05) (0:11) (0:00)
Constant 17:01¤¤¤ 15:84¤¤¤ 14:68¤¤¤ 24:04¤¤¤ 0:95¤¤¤
(2:33) (2:52) (3:50) (4:52) (0:12)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0:49 0:58 0:59 0:65 0:62
51Table 7: Relationship Between Taxes and the Price-Earnings Ratio: Di®erent Variable
Transformations
This table summarizes the coe±cients of the following regression: valt = ®0+®1taxt+
®2rft + ®3¼t + ®4gt + ®5demt + ®6rect + ®7wart + ®8t + ²t, where valt is either the
price-earnings ratio at the end of year t (columns 1 and 2) or the logarithm of the
price-earnings ratio at the end of year t (columns 3 and 4); taxt is either ¿const
t
(columns 1 and 3) or ln(1 ¡ ¿const
t ) (columns 2 and 4); rft is the risk-free interest
rate; ¼t is the in°ation rate; gt is the per-capita real growth rate of GDP; demt is
an indicator variable for whether the president is a Democrat; rect is an indicator
variable for whether the current year is a recession year according to NBER; wart
is an indicator variable for whether the current year is a war year; and t is a linear
time trend. The Newey-West standard errors are summarized in parentheses and use
a four-year lag. The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and
three asterisks denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Raw Logarithm of
Price-Earnings Ratio Price-Earnings Ratio
E®ective Tax Rate ¡35:00¤¤¤ ¡1:71¤¤
(12:84) (0:77)
Log of (1 - E®ective Tax Rate) 28:96¤¤¤ 1:41¤¤
(10:48) (0:63)
Interest Rate ¡71:74¤¤¤ ¡72:88¤¤¤ ¡4:07¤¤¤ ¡4:13¤¤
(22:75) (22:77) (1:38) (1:38)
In°ation Rate ¡32:38¤¤¤ ¡32:26¤¤¤ ¡2:70¤¤¤ ¡2:69¤¤
(11:85) (11:80) (0:82) (0:81)
Growth Rate ¡11:74 ¡12:05 ¡0:80 ¡0:82
(11:11) (11:10) (0:72) (0:72)
Democrat 1:06 1:02 0:02 0:02
(1:51) (1:51) (0:10) (0:10)
Recession 1:62 1:60 0:02 0:02
(2:00) (2:00) (0:11) (0:11)
War 2:30 2:36 0:13 0:14
(1:62) (1:60) (0:12) (0:12)
Time Trend 0:18¤¤¤ 0:18¤¤¤ 0:01¤¤¤ 0:01¤¤¤
(0:05) (0:05) (0:00) (0:00)
Constant 17:01¤¤¤ 16:62¤¤¤ 2:79¤¤¤ 2:77¤¤¤
(2:33) (2:24) (0:15) (0:14)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0:49 0:49 0:51 0:48
52Table 8: Asset Returns and Taxes
This table summarizes the coe±cients of the following OLS regression: rt+k = ®0 +
®1¿t + ®2rft + ®3¼t + ®4gt + ®5demt + ®6rect + ®7wart + ®8t + ²t+k, where rt+k is
the nominal return on the S&P Composite Index during year t + k with k 2 (0;1);
¿t is the aggregate e®ective tax rate using time-varying distribution weights; rft is
the risk-free interest rate; ¼t is the in°ation rate; gt is the per-capita real growth rate
of GDP; demt is an indicator variable for whether the president is a Democrat; rect
is an indicator variable for whether the current year is a recession year according to
NBER; wart is an indicator variable for whether the current year is a war year; and
t is a linear time trend. The ¯rst column uses the return in the current year, and the
second column uses the return in the subsequent year as the dependent variable. The
Newey-West standard errors are summarized in parentheses and use a four-year lag.
The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks
denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
This Year's Return Next Year's Return
(rt) (rt+1)
Tax Rate 0:61¤¤ 0:50¤
(0:24) (0:29)
Interest Rate 0:27 0:65
(0:58) (0:42)
In°ation Rate ¡0:48 ¡0:32
(0:55) (0:31)








Time Trend 0:00 0:00
(0:00) (0:00)
Constant 0:03 0:01
(0:12) (0:09)
Observations 88 87
R2 0:07 0:04
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